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November 19, 2018

Mr. Jose Estrella-Faria (joseangelo.estrella-faria@un.org)
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
Re: Revision of the Legislative Guide on Privately Financed Infrastructure Projects

Dear Mr. Estrella-Faria:
We write as members of the Intergovernmental Expert Group on Public Private
Partnerships to express certain views with respect to the ongoing revision process of the
Legislative Guide on Privately Financed Infrastructure Projects undertaken by the United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Secretariat under
guidance of the UNCITRAL Commission.
1. Placing the Legislative Guide in the current global context1
Private sector financing and PPPs in particular are the cornerstone of many national and
regional infrastructure plans. For example, 47 percent of the investments under the
COSIPLAN-IIRSA plan in Latin America have been reported as privately financed or
structured as PPPs. It is also obvious that private sector participation and PPPs are the
lynchpin of the Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa or PIDA. As
countries, international organizations, MDBs and others mobilize to plan and develop
infrastructure and to bring the private sector into these investments at an unprecedented
rate and scale, however, there is also growing concern that all aspects of sustainability are
not receiving adequate attention and may be neglected or undermined in the process.
Recognizing that financing infrastructure needs for developing countries will require a
fundamental reorientation of their core business, the World Bank Group and other
multilateral development banks (MDBs) are moving to prioritize and maximize the role

1

For a more thorough discussion of issues identified in this section, see Office of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Heinrich Böll Foundation, “The Other
Infrastructure Gap: Sustainability,” (2018) (forthcoming) (Executive Summary available at
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/InfrastructureGapSummary.pdf); see also Brooke
Skartvedt Guven “Blended Finance in 2017: Advancing financing for development but not a
panacea,” in The Yearbook on International Investment Law and Policy 2017, Oxford University
Press (eds. Lisa Sachs and Lise Johnson) (forthcoming).

of private finance for development purposes.2 In 2017, the G20 set in place a Roadmap to
Infrastructure as an Asset Class, and in July 2017, endorsed a set of ‘Principles of MDBs:
strategy for crowding-in Private Sector Finance for growth and sustainable development’
that further strengthens the World Bank Group and other MDBs’ framework for
increasing private investment to support development objectives.3 These recent and
ongoing developments propose to significantly alter how financing for development,
including through PPPs, is conceptualized and implemented, with drastic implications for
how and under what circumstances governments should promote, facilitate or prohibit
PPPs and how to best regulate them to ensure that they contribute to sustainable
development objectives.
In the 15 years since the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide was drafted, empirical evidence
in the intervening years raises concerns about the actual development benefits of these
kinds of contractual arrangements, particularly in light of the increasingly apparent
financial, fiscal, environmental, and human rights costs. As a general matter, whether and
For example, in 2015 the World Bank Group introduced its “Billions to Trillions” approach to
development finance. See World Bank and IMF Development Committee, ‘From Billions to
Trillions: Transforming Development Finance’ (April 2 2015).
http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/622841485963735448/DC2015-0002-EFinancingforDevelopment.pdf. This was followed by the March 2017 “Cascade Approach” to
leverage the private sector for growth and sustainable development. World Bank and IMF
Development Committee, ‘Forward Look A Vision for the World Bank Group in 2030 – Progress
and Challenges’ (March 24 2017) available at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DEVCOMMINT/Documentation/23745169/DC20170002.pdf. In turn, this was followed by the July 2017 “Maximizing Finance for Development:
Leveraging the Private Sector for Growth and Sustainable Development” agenda. See Joint
Ministerial Committee of the Boards of Governors of the Bank and the Fund on the Transfer of
Real Resources to Developing Counties, ‘Maximizing Finance for Development: Leveraging the
Private Sector for Growth and Sustainable Development’ (19 September 2017)
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DEVCOMMINT/Documentation/23758671/DC20170009_Maximizing_8-19.pdf. For more information on Maximizing Finance for Development see
The World Bank, ‘Maximizing Finance for Development (MFD)’ see
http://www.worldbank.org/en/about/partners/maximizing-finance-for-development.
3
See G20 – IFA WG, ‘Principles of MDBs’ strategy for crowding-in Private Sector Finance for
growth and sustainable development’ (April 2017) available at
http://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/Content/EN/Standardartikel/Topics/Featured/G20/G20Documents/principles-on-crowding-in-private-sector-finance-april20.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=2. The Group of 20 (G20) member countries in October 2018
received the Report of the Eminent Persons Group on Global Financial Governance which calls
for bold reforms to harness complementarities and synergies in the development system. Report
of the G20 EPG on Global Financial Governance (Oct. 2018) available at
https://www.globalfinancialgovernance.org/report-of-the-g20-epg-on-gfg/. While a core part of
these proposed reforms look to improvements in investment climates of host-countries, they also
call for enhanced collaboration among international financial institutions (IFIs) and development
partners, embarking on system-wide insurance and diversification of risk, the creation of
infrastructure investments as an asset class, and the mobilization of significantly greater private
sector participation in advancing financing for development purposes. PPPs will be a core part of
these initiatives.
2
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under what circumstances a PPP may be the optimal solution to advance infrastructure
investment, development and/or management remains unclear and highly context
specific, with benefits often questionable and costs well documented.4 It is also now
apparent that many countries do not have the capacity to properly implement PPPs,5 that
this capacity takes years to properly develop, that such capacity is not present even in
many developed economies,6 and that not all proposed PPPs are rigorously evaluated or
have the appropriate structure to advance a specific project,7 or larger sustainable
development objectives.8 The failure to implement a PPP correctly can have massive and
long-lasting financial as well as human and environmental costs that cannot be ignored
when considering legislative or contractual guidance on these arrangements.
In 2015, through adoption of Agenda 2030 and the sustainable development goals
(SDGs), the United Nations and each of its member states identified sustainable
development—including its economic, social, environmental, and governance
dimensions—as a key global priority.9 These agreed priorities include the financing of
sustainable, accessible, affordable and resilient quality infrastructure, which some
estimate will require US$ 90 trillion in investment between now and the year 2030. This

E.g. European Court of Auditors, “Public Private Partnerships in the EU: Widespread
shortcomings and limited benefits” (March 20, 2018), available
at https://www.eca.europa.eu/en/Pages/NewsItem.aspx?nid=9917; see also The World Bank
Group, “Government Objectives: Benefits and Risks of PPPs” available at
https://ppp.worldbank.org/public-private-partnership/overview/ppp-objectives; see, also, J. Luis
Guasch, “Granting and Renegotiating Infrastructure Concessions: Doing it right” (The World
Bank, 2004) available at
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/678041468765605224/Granting-and-renegotiatinginfrastructure-concessions-doing-it-right; see also J. Luis Guasch, Jean-Jacques Laffont and
Stéphane Straub, “Infrastructure Concessions in Latin America” (World Bank Policy Research
Working Paper 3749, October 2005) available at
https://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/abs/10.1596/1813-9450-3749.
5
See UNCTAD. Trade and Development Report (2015), Chapter VI. Available at:
https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/tdr2015_en.pdf
6
The European Court of Auditors 2018 report states “Implementing successful PPPs requires
considerable administrative capability that can be ensured only through suitable institutional and
legal frameworks and long-lasting experience in the implementation of PPP projects. We found
that these are available in only a limited number of EU Member States.” Supra note 4.
7
World Bank Support to Public-Private Partnerships: Lessons from Experience in Client
Countries FY02-12. Available at:
http://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/sites/default/files/Data/reports/ppp_eval_updated2_0.pdf
8
The Economist, Intelligence Unit, Infrascope PPP Index, available at
http://infrascope.eiu.com/; Antonio Estache and Caroline Philippe, “The Impact of Private
Participation in Infrastructure in Development Countries: Taking Stock of about 20 years of
Experience,” No ECARES 2012-043, Working Papers ECARES, Université Libre de Bruxelles
(2012) available at
https://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/9619d7004db7542d8443a4ab7d7326c0/INR+Note+2++The+Impact+of+Private+Participation+on+Infrastructure's+performance.pdf?MOD=AJPERES.
9
See United Nations. Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
Development (A/RES/70/1) (2015).
4
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level of finance will require an additional US$ 1.5 trillion per year to be directed to
infrastructure investment in developing countries.
In order to address these financing gaps, the 2015 Addis Ababa Action Agenda (the
Addis Agenda) identifies the critical role that the private sector can play in ensuring that
financial resources are targeted toward development objectives.10 In fact, the Addis
Agenda identified the following principles (the Addis Principles) for the effective
governance of blended finance, including PPPs (the Addis Principles):11
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Careful consideration given to the structure and use of blended finance
instruments;
Sharing risks and reward fairly;
Meeting social and environmental standards;
Alignment with sustainable development, to ensure “sustainable, accessible,
affordable and resilient quality infrastructure”;
Ensuring clear accountability mechanisms;
Ensuring transparency, including in public procurement frameworks and
contracts;
Ensuring participation, particularly of local communities in decisions affecting
their communities;
Ensuring effective management, accounting, and budgeting for contingent
liabilities, and debt sustainability; and
Alignment with national priorities and relevant principles of effective
development cooperation

Other similar principles emerged around the same time. For example, another UN
agency, the Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE), has set forth ‘Guiding
Principles on People-First Public-Private Partnerships for the United Nations Sustainable
Development Goals’ focused on procedural (e.g. information, participation and
transparency) rights and with an emphasis on poverty eradication and more equitable
income allocations,12 while the OECD Development Assistance Committee created the
‘Blended Finance Principles for Unlocking Commercial Finance for the Sustainable

United Nations, ‘Addis Ababa Action Agenda of the Third International Conference on
Financing for Development’, (27 July 2015), available at http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/wpcontent/uploads/2015/08/AAAA_Outcome.pdf. The Agenda was endorsed by the United Nations
General Assembly (UNGA), UNGA Res 69/313 (July 27 2015) UN Doc A/RES/69/313.
11
Motoko Aizawa. A Scoping Study of PPP Guidelines. DESA Working Paper No. 154 (2018).
Available from: http://www.un.org/esa/desa/papers/2018/wp154_2018.pdf
12
Available at
https://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/ceci/documents/2018/PPP/Forum/Documents/Revised_G
uiding_Principles_for_People-first_PPPs_in_support_of_the_UN_SDGs-Part_I.pdf; also see:
https://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/ceci/documents/2017/PPP/Activity_ECECityU/Geoffrey_Hamilton-UNECE_People-first_PPPs.pdf
10
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Development Goals.13 These new sets of principles suggest a reorientation in the
approach to PPPs will be necessary to respond to the globally recognized challenges
surrounding PPPs since their first emergence in the 1980’s.
2. UNCITRAL as an UN body has a critical role to play with respect to the
Legislative Guidelines
As the Secretariat, under guidance of the Commission, advances its mandate to update
the Legislative Guide, it is instructive to consider UNCITRAL’s role as a UN body and
its duty to further the objectives set forth in the UN Charter, the human rights framework,
and the SDGs.
If the SDGs are to be achieved, private sector investment—and the legal frameworks that
govern it—will need to play a supportive role.14 This must be accomplished in
accordance with a clear orientation toward sustainable development with the
underpinning of the broader human rights framework. The update of UNCITRAL
Legislative Guide presents an important opportunity for the UN to align its own position
on privatization across and within its many bodies. By establishing greater coherence
across UN entities on these issues, the Secretariat could also benefit from the expertise
and experience of other UN bodies and mandate holders, many of whom have worked or
are working on PPPs and related issues.
For example, in addition to work of the Office of the High Commissioner on Human
Rights and the UN Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights’ work
described below, UNECE is currently developing a model concession law, aligned with
its Guiding Principles on People first PPPs, mentioned above. The Secretariat should
consider joining forces with UNECE and benefit from their insights on how to promote
PPPs that put public interest at the center of the PPP selection and implementation
process. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) has
advocated for the case of aligning investment with sustainable development through its
Investment Policy Framework for Sustainable Development,15 and has called for “more
exacting and encompassing policy measures to address global and national asymmetries
in resource mobilization, technological know-how, market power and political influence
caused by hyperglobalization that have generated exclusionary outcomes, and will

13

Available from: https://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/developmentfinance-topics/OECD-Blended-Finance-Principles.pdf
14
See, e.g., id., at 21 (setting forth Goal 10 and its targets); see also Johnson, Space for Local
Content and Strategies: A crucial time to revisit an old debate (GiZ, July 2016) available at
https://academiccommons.columbia.edu/doi/10.7916/D8V40VRC; UN Committee for
Development Policy, Policy Note: Expanding Productive Capacity: Lessons learned from
graduating least developed countries (UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, December
2017) (discussing the contributions FDI can make to the SDGs) available at
https://www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/publication/expanding-productive-capacity-lessonslearned-from-graduating-least-developed-countries/.
15
Available at: https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/diaepcb2015d5_en.pdf
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perpetuate them if no action is taken.”16 UNCTAD has also considered risks resulting
from the intersection of investment law and PPPs.17 As the Secretariat is already aware,
the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA) has strongly advocated
the integration of the economic, social and environmental dimensions of sustainable
development in development finance, and already urged UNCITRAL at its last Expert
Group meeting in November 2017 to align the updated Legislative Guide with the Addis
Principles.
In sum, UN bodies and experts have raised extensive and profound concerns about the
risks of PPPs, as well as concerns about PPPs missing the opportunities to advance the
SDGs and help realize human rights, and have made suggestions on how to ensure
careful use of investments structured as PPPs. There is recognition within the UN that
PPPs too often result in lopsided outcomes that favor the interests of investors at the
expense of the state and people, and may not advance the SDGs in a rights-respecting
manner. To the extent PPPs continue to be used, a fundamental reorientation of their
purpose and structure is required.
3. The updated Legislative Guide on Privately Financed Infrastructure Projects
should be a unique and timely resource to states
As described in the Note by the Secretariat, document A/CN.9/939, the UNCITRAL
Secretariat, under the guidance of the UNCITRAL Commission, is in the process of
preparing proposed updates to the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide. Through various
consultations that the Secretariat has conducted during this process, experts have
concluded, and the UNCITRAL Secretariat has accepted, that “most of the
recommendations of the PFIPs texts reflect good policy and practices, and remain
relevant. However, limited revisions to update the PFIPs texts are considered necessary,
in order to take into account developments in practice since the existing Legislative
Guide was issued in 2000.”18 The Secretariat is preparing amendments to (1) consolidate
the Legislative Recommendations and the Model Provisions, (2) change/substitute titles
and terminology, (3) update the documents to reflect the underlying principles of the
United Nations Convention against Corruption, (4) expand the advice on project

E.g. Trade and Development Report 2017: Beyond Austerity – Towards a Global New Deal
(United Nations publication, Sales No. E.17.II.D.5).
17
See mapping of PPP-related investment claims at
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Pages/mapping-of-ppp-related-isds-cases. For an analysis
of the impact of the intersection of investment law and PPPs see Brooke Skartvedt Guven and
Lise Johnson, “PPPs and ISDS: A Risky Combination,” UNCTAD Investment Policy Hub Blog
(24 May 2018) available at http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Blog/Index/65; see also Lise
Johnson, “The Impact of Investment Treaties on Governance of Private Investment in
Infrastructure,” Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Research Studies, Research Paper No.
RSCAS 2014/32 (2014) available at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2411575.
18
A/CN.9/939 ¶ 10.
16

6

preparation, and (5) align Chapter III (“Selection of the Concessionaire”) with the 2012
UNCITRAL Model Law on Public Procurement.19
We agree that the above issues should be addressed in any update to the Legislative
Guide. However, as described above and more specifically in the following section of
this letter, we express concern that this extremely limited mandate ignores fundamental
and wide-ranging issues, empirical evidence, and normative developments that must be
included in any update to the Legislative Guide.
It is in this vein that we acknowledge that it may be possible to update the UNCITRAL
Legislative Guide to account for the extensive developments related to PPPs that have
advanced over the intervening 15 years since its publication, even though we question
whether the fundamental rethinking of how PPPs are conceptualized and implemented is
possible within the current structure and framework of the Legislative Guide. It is with
concern that we note that the proposed updates to the Legislative Guide as framed by the
UNCITRAL Secretariat do not dedicate comprehensive attention to understanding or
integrating the broader impacts of PPPs on climate change objectives, on all stakeholders
(particularly those whose infrastructure usage needs and patterns may differ from those of
more dominant aspects of society, such as women, the poor, or the disabled), and the
disparate outcomes of PPP projects and how those outcomes may vary based on
economic and institutional structures of the host country.
140 jurisdictions around the world already have PPP or concession laws on their books.20
As far as we are aware, no systematic analysis of these PPP laws exists. Although
UNCTAD has a comprehensive web-based resource for investment laws from over 100
jurisdictions,21 no comparable body of research is available for PPP laws. The closest
resource may be the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Infrascope, which publishes indicators
for effective PPPs by country. In addition, limited regional resources exist. For example,
an ASEAN PPP Guidelines contains a brief ‘Summary of PPP Framework/ Experience in
the ASEAN Member Countries’,22 and a project of TradeLab and Monash University’s
International Economic Law Clinic recently reviewed PPP laws of 18 jurisdictions of
Sub-Saharan Africa. The latter study indicates that sustainability content in such PPP
laws is generally insufficient.23
Considering the vintage of some of the PPP laws, some countries should be ready for
updates of these PPP laws. These countries are important “client” countries of the
updated Legislative Guide, just as the other countries that are currently without PPP laws
19

A/CN.9/939 ¶¶ 14-29.
Available at: https://ppp.worldbank.org/public-private-partnership/legislationregulation/laws/ppp-and-concession-laws.
21
Available at: http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/InvestmentLaws.
22
Available at: http://www.eria.org/ASEAN_PPP_Guidelines_Full_Report.pdf.
23
An unpublished project report of TradeLab and the Monash University’s International
Economic Law Clinic, October 2018. It found that the PPP laws fail to sufficiently mention
relevant environmental and social standards, sustainable development, community participation,
and alignment with national development plans, among other factors.
20
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and are considering a new law on the topic. A comprehensive review of existing PPP
laws would be an invaluable source of information for these countries; equally, such a
review could have played (and should play) a key role in UNCITRAL’s efforts to update
the Legislative Guide by offering lessons learned on the successes and failures of PPPs
from around the world. In the absence of such empirical data and reflections on
experiences, UNCITRAL’s advice to countries, as they consider the next generation PPP
laws, should draw from the latest principles and initiatives at the UN level and elsewhere
discussed in sections 1 and 2 above that reflect the insights on how to improve PPPs.
These principles and initiatives reflect the views of different stakeholder groups,
including states.
UNCITRAL faces a unique opportunity to respond to the expectations placed on PPPs to
enable countries to promote sustainable development and achieve the SDGs – not only to
achieve Goal 9 on Industry, Innovation and Infrastructure, but in fact all of the SDGs.
Indeed, the SDGs are interlinked and interdependent and must be implemented as an
indivisible whole. As such, efforts to achieve more easily monetized SDGs cannot come
at the expense of less quantifiable but no less critical goals, including, for example, those
related to climate, the environment, ecosystems, gender equality, reduced inequality, or
building peace, justice and strong institutions. But of course, the world will neither meet
the SDGs nor meet the climate goals under the Paris Agreement without sustainable
infrastructure. By rebalancing and reorienting the Legislative Guide, UNCITRAL can
better guide countries on how to realize one of the important options available to them to
finance much needed infrastructure that minimizes risks and create benefits, while also
bearing in mind how infrastructure fits into the broader SDG objectives. This opportunity
to offer a unique and timely Legislative Guide that is fit for the new generation of PPPs
must not be missed.
To meet this challenge, the Legislative Guide must rebalance its approach away from a
primary focus on creating a regulatory environment that is favorable to investors, and
toward advice on how to help states attract private investment while protecting states’
right and interest, including their right and duty to regulate in order to create multiple
public benefit and public good. Not all investment is desirable investment, and when the
proper processes are not followed and appropriate legal and policy frameworks are not in
place, investment can harm rather than benefit host societies. A revised Legislative Guide
must acknowledge the recurrent problems associated with PPPs that have been identified
by stakeholders around the world and are increasingly evidenced empirically, including
those of large fiscal and non-fiscal costs associated with PPPs. The new principles on
PPPs and blended finance are helpful in setting the right orientation for updating the
Legislative Guide.
Legislators and practitioners have already access to several PPP contractual models that
cater to the needs of investors; for example, the World Bank’s Guidance on PPP
Contractual Provisions24 and FIDIC contract forms accommodate the interests of
24

Available at: https://ppp.worldbank.org/public-private-partnership/library/guidance-on-pppcontractual-provisions-2017-edition. We note that this Guidance is referred to several times in
revised Chapter I of the Legislative Guide as a resource for states, but reiterate that this World
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investors but do not sufficiently focus on the needs of states.25 As the Argentine G20 has
focused on tools to standardize investments in infrastructure, one can expect additional
contractual tools to standardize investor protection in PPP contracts to be forthcoming.
As such, when states seek a model law or contract that will present a sustainable and
rights respecting approach to PPPs (taking account of the broad interests of the state,
including its citizens and society at large) states currently face a serious information gap.
This gap must be filled urgently.26 We need a document that clearly explains the state’s
rights and interests, while placing PPPs in the context of broader public policy discourse
that is taking place and some innovations designed to address these public policy
challenges.
We encourage the Secretariat, should it continue towards finalizing the update of the
Legislative Guide, to proceed with deliberate attention to the global public policy
discourse as it relates to PPPs and into which this Legislative Guide would be delivered.
We encourage due attention to and consideration of the wide-ranging evidence of
environmental, climate, social, human rights, financial, fiscal, and governance impacts of
PPPs that now form a critical part of the discourse in other fora and to systematically and
consistently address these issues throughout the Legislative Guide. An updated
Legislative Guide that does not adequately account for these developments will be
unhelpful at best, and could be harmful to the stated development objectives of UN
member states at worst.
4. Additional updates that should be included in the Legislative Guide
In this Section, we set forth the following broad issue areas that should be systemically
addressed in the proposed update in order to ensure that the update reflects the broader
public policy issues and the orientation toward sustainable development under discussion
in multiple fora:
a. Sustainable development and the SDGs
As noted in the earlier sections of this letter, sustainable development should be at the
heart of PPP selection and implementation, and for this reason, the Legislative Guide
should provide guidance to legislators on how to realize this vision of development and to
help countries achieve the SDGs. This means sustainable development and the SDGs
should be “mainstreamed” and be clearly explained as an opportunity and responsibility
of PPPs throughout the whole of the PPP lifecycle. The draft chapters of the Legislative
Bank Guidance has been subject to ongoing criticism for its failure to take the interests of both
states and a broader set of stakeholders into account (see following footnote).
25
For a critique of the 2017 version of the World Bank Guidance, see Foley Hoag, “Summary
Comments on the World Bank Group’s 2017 Guidance on PPP Contractual Provisions,” (Sept.
17, 2017) available at https://us.boell.org/2017/09/15/summary-comments-world-bank-groups2017-guidance-ppp-contractual-provisions-0.
26
One available resource is IISD (2017). Contracts for Sustainable Infrastructure. Available at:
https://www.iisd.org/library/contracts-sustainable-infrastructure-ensuring-economic-social-andenvironmental-co-benefits
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Guide miss the opportunity to provide this much needed guidance for states. For
example, Chapter IV (PPP Implementation: legal framework and PPP contract) is entirely
silent on the topic, and conveys the sense that sustainability is unrelated to PPP
implementation. In other places, references are made to financial or environmental
sustainability but not to the social and human rights aspects. There should be a
comprehensive reorientation of all of the chapters in order to place the Guide in the
context of the current global discourse on PPPs and the role that they are expected to play
to further the SDGs. Without such a reorientation, the Legislative Guide could simply
repeat the advice of other numerous outdated guidance on PPPs without adding value.27
b. Public vs. Private nature of PPPs
The draft chapters proposed for the Legislative Guide continue to portray the governance
of PPPs as, for the most part, a binary contractual arrangement under private contract law
between a contracting authority and a private partner. Although the Introduction chapter
states that ‘The advice provided in the Guide aims to achieve a balance between
facilitating PPPs and protecting the public interest,’ and provides some discussion of
what this means in theory (including for example, discussion of the public interest and
transparency), the scope of the public interest and public policy issues is narrowly drawn
throughout the remaining chapters and insufficiently elaborated in context.28 In contrast,
the chapters provide detailed explanations on how states can facilitate and protect the
interest of the private partner.
This tendency can be observed in Chapter IV, which emphasizes the freedom and
flexibility of contracts, while generally underplaying the fundamentally public nature of
infrastructure and its role in sustainable development, and the public sector
responsibilities associated with it. While briefly noting certain advancements in
transparency practices, Chapter VI (Settlement of Disputes) is drafted as if dispute
resolution of PPPs were purely a private international law matter. When a government is
involved in an investment dispute, even when such dispute is contractual, the public
nature of government obligations must be accounted for, as further elaborated below.
Similarly, Chapter VII (Other relevant areas of law) identifies a narrow range of laws
with mostly commercial orientation as relevant to PPPs, while insufficiently or
inappropriately describing other relevant areas of the law. For example, the Chapter
correctly identifies consumer protection law as being relevant in PPPs, but it describes

27

See Aizawa (2018).
One exception to this comment is the treatment of unsolicited proposals in Chapter III. We
commend the Secretariat for taking up this difficult topic that has eluded the attention of many
other organizations involved in PPPs. Although we feel that the likelihood of innovation in new
technologies and products benefiting a country and the PPP officials’ ability to closely analyze
such technologies and products are generally overvalued, and would have preferred that any
guidance on this (or any other) topic be first informed by a systematic empirical study on
unsolicited proposals. Nonetheless, it is a welcome development that this topic is explicitly
included in Chapter III as needing special attention of PPP officials.
28
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measures to protect consumers’ rights as hindering the investors’ right to be paid for
services rendered (paragraph 46 of Chapter VII).
The draft chapters’ focus on the bilateral relationship between the contracting parties
means they do not take into account the important role and interests of other stakeholders,
especially those stakeholders who are outside the bilateral relationship between the
contracting parties, such as the affected communities, consumers of infrastructure
services, taxpayers, citizens, and the population at large.29 Those references to such
stakeholders appear almost as an afterthought.
Even when privately financed, the owners, investors, and financiers of infrastructure
assets must realize that they are custodians of public assets. The contracting authorities
have the right and duty to regulate, which they cannot derogate or delegate, and have the
obligation to ensure transparency of PPP information, effective participation of the
public, and accountability of PPP decision makers. These obligations of a state are not
merely based on evolving practice, but are fundamental aspects of the international
human rights framework and thus are international legal obligations of states. The private
partner should refrain from exploiting its unique position of being entrusted with public
infrastructure building, ownership or operation, while discharging its responsibility to
respect human rights. This public orientation in PPPs should be apparent in the
Legislative Guide from the beginning to the end.
c. Transparency, participation, accountability and remedy
Transparency, participation and accountability are well-recognized governance
principles, as well as human rights principles. Members of the public have a right to
appropriate information about PPPs, including public access to PPP contracts, or at least
the key terms of contracts, as well as the right to participate in consultation meetings to
voice their views. Affected indigenous peoples and communities have the right to provide
or withhold free, prior, and informed consent to proposed PPPs. People are also entitled
to hold public officials to account for their infrastructure planning and implementation
decisions. States must take appropriate steps to ensure, through judicial, administrative,
legislative or other means, that when negative impacts occur, those affected have access
to effective remedy.30 Public ombuds and other grievance mechanisms in relation to PPPs
should be available to aggrieved parties.
Although the draft chapters address transparency in various places, the commentaries
often focus on transparency issues relevant to the contracting parties and not to the
broader stakeholder groups; for example, Section 6 of Chapter IV (Disclosure
Requirements and Transparency Obligations) is written from the viewpoint of the
contracting parties and ends with an admonishment not to burden the private partner with
excessive reporting requirements. Similarly, Section (k) (Arbitration) of Chapter VI
Aizawa (2018); also see UNECE’s Guiding Principles for People first PPPs.
Paragraph 25 of the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights.
Available at:
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf.
29
30
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(Disclosure Requirements and Transparency Obligations) refers to the “growing trend
toward transparency on investor-State dispute settlement, which is encouraged by the
[Mauritius Convention].” While the Mauritius Convention is an important step, it is
merely a procedural mechanism by which states commit to realizing their preexisting
human rights obligations in a specific context.31 The important governance and human
rights concepts of transparency, participation and accountability must be described from
the perspective of the public throughout the Legislative Guide.
d. Empirical evidence-based assessment of contexts in which PPPs may
be desirable
PPPs is a broad concept that can be used to describe a wide variety of contractual
structures in many sectors. While the Legislative Guide is appropriately of a more general
nature, the benefits and risks of PPPs are different in different sectors, and therefore the
desired legislative policies and frameworks may vary to a certain extent. For example, the
costs and benefits of PPPs in more traditional sectors such as transportation (roads,
tunnels, bridges, rail, mass transit, ports, airports) and power and energy (generation
assets, distribution systems), will differ from PPPs in water and waste (bulk water
treatment, water distribution and sewage, solid waste management), and may
significantly differ from PPPs in more social sectors including education (school
facilities, services), health (hospitals, other health facilities and services), agriculture
(irrigation, drainage, agro-investment), prisons, and urban housing. Moreover, the
appropriateness of implementing a PPP in any one of these sectors will be highly context
dependent. It may be valuable to integrate into the Legislative Guide more attention to
these particular issues, including questions that policy-makers may wish to consider when
determining the desirability of a PPP in a specific context.
We note, for example, that Chapter I (General legislative and institutional framework)
Section (C) Scope of authority to enter into PPPs section (1) (Authorized agencies and
relevant fields of activity) suggests that it is desirable for legislation to identify those
sectors for which a PPP may be awarded, but then goes on, without noting the significant
public policy implications, that “where this is not deemed feasible or desirable, the law
might identify those activities, which may not be the subject of a concession…” It is well
understood that the differences between opt-in versus opt-out legal frameworks and
policy measures can have serious implications on the public interest, particularly as such
choice creates incentives to have or not have focused discussions and public debate based
on empirical evidence surrounding the desirability of PPPs in specific sectors. In this and
other areas, the Legislative Guide should holistically incorporate and identify points at
which empirical evidence should be considered in the context of government decisionmaking.

31

The Mauritius Convention (2014), which entered into force in 2017, has only five state parties.
See
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/uncitral_texts/arbitration/2014Transparency_Convention.html.
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e. Objectives of investment and PPPs
As mentioned above, in conceptualizing the objectives of investment in PPPs, various
principles and guidelines have been developed to help policy-makers to ensure that legal
and policy frameworks support investment and investment processes consistent with
sustainable development objectives. Such thinking could usefully be included in updated
Legislative Guide. In addition to the principles and initiatives described in Section 1, see,
for example: G7 Ise-Shima Principles for Promoting Quality Infrastructure Investment,32
OECD’s Getting Infrastructure Right;33 draft South-South Principles on International
Investment for Sustainable Development,34 Stockholm Statement - Towards a new
consensus on the principles of policy-making for the contemporary world,35 Rethinking
International Investment Governance; Principles for the 21st Century.36
We note more specifically that Section 1 of Chapter VII suggests that investment
promotion and protection provisions of investment law be aligned with PPP law. We
suggest a fundamental revision of this section based on current understandings of the role
of investment facilitation and investment law. Regretfully, this section focuses on what
kinds of promotion, facilitation, and protection are desirable from the perspective of a
private investor and project promoter. For example, recommendations of liberalizing
capital controls fail to note IMF guidance on situations in which capital controls may be
desirable from a macroeconomic, let alone public policy, perspective.
Similarly, the Legislative Guide, to the extent it will discuss investment promotion,
should include a broader discussion of how countries may determine what kinds of
investment they may wish to promote, based, for example, on work that the OECD is
doing on quality investment, and then determine what kinds of promotion strategies may
be desirable to attract this kind of investment. Investment incentives and local content
policies, for example, can be strategically used to this end, but the ability of countries to
engage in this kind of strategic policymaking may be precluded by terms of investment
treaties.37
Moreover, investment facilitation is also increasingly a focus of broader aspects of
investment policymaking. When a sustainability lens is brought to this discussion and the
pros and cons of facilitation are considered from the perspective of a wider group of
stakeholders, investment requirements that may seem unduly burdensome in the eyes of
32

Available at https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000196472.pdf.
Available at https://www.oecd.org/gov/getting-infrastructure-right.pdf.
34
Available at https://www.iisd.org/sites/default/files/uploads/investment-sustainabledevelopment-views-global-south.pdf.
35
Available at https://www.wider.unu.edu/news/stockholm-statement-–-towards-new-consensusprinciples-policy-making-contemporary-world.
36
Available at http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2018/09/Rethinking-Investment-GovernanceSeptember-2018.pdf.
37
“Rethinking Investment Incentives: Trends and Policy Options,” Columbia University Press
(eds. Ana Teresa Tavares-Lehmann, Perrine Toledano, Lise Johnson and Lisa Sachs) (July 2016);
Johnson,supra note 16..
33
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the regulated may, from a broader perspective, be crucial for ensuring that projects are
developed with input from impacted and interested stakeholders and that resulting
investments benefit people and planet.38 Investment policy should be discussed from a
broad and coherent perspective.
With respect to bilateral investment treaties (BITs), paragraph 5 should account for
current trends relating to bilateral investment treaties. For example, in 2017 more
bilateral investment treaties were terminated than signed. In recent years countries have
terminated a wide range of treaties and, when new agreements are signed, significant
changes are made to those treaties (e.g. inclusion of investor obligations; narrowing the
scope of substantive standards) to attempt to rebalance the benefits and obligations of
these agreements. The investor-friendly nature of old-generation treaties has led to the
current legitimacy crisis of these agreements, which, among other places, is being
considered within UNCITRAL’s own Working Group III’s works on ISDS reform.
Please see subsection (l) below in this letter for further discussion on dispute settlement.
Furthermore, we advocate evidence-based guidance. From this perspective, statements
such as “[t]he existence of such an agreement between the host and the originating
country or countries of the project sponsors may play an important role in their decision
to invest in the host country,” should be stricken. While the existence of a BIT certainly
impacts the corporate structure of the ultimate investment by employing the use of treatyshopping or “round-tripping”, empirical evidence does not demonstrate that the existence
of a BIT impacts the ultimate decision to make an investment.39 At the same time, BITs
have serious costs to host countries that can significantly undermine sustainable

Jesse Coleman, Brooke Guven, Lise Johnson and Lisa Sachs, “What do We Mean by
Investment Facilitation,” CCSI Blog (February 21, 2018) available at
http://ccsi.columbia.edu/2018/02/22/what-do-we-mean-by-investment-facilitation/.
39
Some studies find evidence of a correlation between investment flows and investment treaties,
while others do not. It is important to note, however, that not all studies are of the same quality.
Lauge N Poulsen discusses a number of them and their results in Lauge N Poulsen, ‘The
Importance of BITs for Foreign Direct Investment and Political Risk Insurance: Revisiting the
Evidence’ in Karl P Sauvant (ed), Yearbook on International Investment Law & Policy 20092010 (Oxford University Press, 2010) 539-574 (hereafter, Poulsen, ‘The Importance of BITs’).
Most studies on the connection between investment treaties and investment flows have looked
specifically at whether the conclusion of such treaties had an impact on flows of foreign direct
investment (FDI) (as opposed to other types of international investment). As has been remarked
by several scholars, these types of studies are problematic for a number of reasons, including that
data on FDI flows is often inaccurate or inadequately disaggregated, and that, even if one were to
find correlation between investment treaties and FDI flows, it would be extremely difficult to
establish that the treaties actually caused those investments. See Poulsen, ‘The Importance of
BITs’”; Emma Aisbett, ‘Bilateral Investment Treaties and Foreign Direct Investment: Correlation
versus causation’ in Karl P. Sauvant and Lisa E Sachs (eds), The Effect of Treaties on Foreign
Direct Investment: Bilateral Investment Treaties, Double Taxation Treaties, and Investment
Flows (Oxford University Press 2009) 395; Jason W Yackee, ‘Bilateral Investment Treaties,
Credible Commitment, and The Rule of (International) Law: Do BITs promote foreign direct
investment?’ (2008) 42 Law and Society Review 805.
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development objectives.40 Such costs and benefits from the perspective of states, and an
evidence-based discussion of them, must be addressed in this section and throughout the
Legislative Guide.
f. Human rights
The human rights impacts of PPPs can be multidimensional and profound. In a
forthcoming publication, “The Other Infrastructure Gap: Sustainability”, with respect to
which both of the undersigned made significant contributions, the extensive
environmental and human rights gaps relating to mega-infrastructure are identified and
analyzed.41 This publication is critical because it places infrastructure investment within
the current geopolitical context, grapples with current factors driving infrastructure
investment, and proposes targeted solutions to both mitigate negative consequences and
to make infrastructure investment work for sustainable development purposes.42
Recommendations for policy makers include the regular practice of human rights due
diligence, by both public and private sector actors, not only at the outset of the PPP life
cycle, but also throughout the course of PPP as necessary.
The UN Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights, Philip Alston, in
October 2018, issued a detailed report examining the extensive human rights impacts of
privatization including the systemic elimination of human rights protections and the
further marginalization of the interests of low-income earners and those living in poverty
in developing and also in developed countries.43 The Special Rapporteur traces the
evolution of decades of privatization, noting that in the early 2000s, when the
UNCITRAL Legislative Guide was drafted, PPPs were seen as a favored mechanism of
correcting market failures and creating markets for investment.44 In the intervening years,
Lise Johnson, Lisa Sachs, Brooke Guven and Jesse Coleman, “Costs and Benefits of
Investment Treaties: Practical Considerations for States,” CCSI Policy Paper (March 2018)
available at http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2018/04/07-Columbia-IIA-investor-policy-briefingENG-mr.pdf.
41
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Heinrich Böll
Foundation (2018) (forthcoming), supra note 1.
42
Solutions, specifically targeted toward policy-makers, states, MDBs and IFIs, and other nonstate actors, as appropriate, include: (1) Enhance information disclosure, consultation,
participation, and accountability in infrastructure projects, including appropriate grievance
redress mechanisms, (2) Ensure project selection and design are consistent with the host country’s
national development plan and international human rights and environmental commitments, (3)
Integrate human rights criteria within universal standards for sustainable, accessible, affordable
and resilient quality infrastructure, (4) Ensure that all relevant public and private actors involved
in infrastructure carry out human rights due diligence to inform and improve decision making, (5)
Address the environmental and human rights risks associated with the investor protection regime
comprised of international investment agreements, national investment laws and State-investor
contracts, (6) Address the environmental and human rights risks associated with the efforts to
attract private investment in infrastructure, (7) Integrate a gender perspective and address
discrimination.
43
UN Doc A/73/396.
44
UN Doc A/73/396 ¶ 8.
40
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significant evidence has emerged about the human rights impacts of PPPs. The Special
Rapporteur considers these years of experience with PPPs in drawing his conclusions as
to their impacts. Global civil society has also been increasingly critical of the negative
social, human rights, environmental, governance, fiscal and financial impacts of public
private partnerships.45
Considering these critiques, Chapter VII should refer to the international human rights
framework and areas of domestic law that protect and promote human rights (including
but not limited to labor, health, safety and security, corporate governance, antitrust, and
immigration laws, and laws and procedures that promote disclosure of information,
public consultation, accountability of decisions makers, and grievance mechanisms) as
relevant to PPPs. Similarly, Chapter IV should encourage both the contracting authority
and the private partner to carry out human rights due diligence in order to identify and
take appropriate steps to avoid or mitigate negative impacts throughout the life of the
PPP.
g. Labor
PPPs are frequently justified on the basis that they will promote economic growth and
create jobs. Since jobs can be one of the central social co-benefits of PPPs, close attention
to the number and types of jobs that PPPs can create, including long-term local jobs, and
the quality of jobs, such as working conditions, protection of the workforce, and labor
conditions in the supply chain, is necessary. Although all countries have enacted a wide
range of domestic labor laws, PPPs, especially those with foreign investors, should
adhere to international labor standards, including the International Labour Organization’s
Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work.46 Taking these aspects into
account, references to labor in Chapter IV should be strengthened; furthermore, Chapter
VII’s failure to reference labor and occupational health and safety laws must be rectified.
h. Climate Change
In 2015, the Paris Agreement on Climate Change embodied universal consensus on the
need for states to take steps to hold the increase in global average temperature well below
2°C above pre-industrial levels. The effects of climate change do and will continue to
have a disproportionate impact on already vulnerable groups and individuals, and on
countries with limited resources and fragile ecosystems. In order to promote the kinds of
infrastructure investments that will adequately and appropriately support climate change
adaptation and mitigation, a fundamental reorientation of the global economy and how
investment is conceptualized is necessary. Government policies and legislative
frameworks governing infrastructure investment, including PPPs, can be used to shape
the extent to which such investment contributes to ameliorating, or exacerbating, climate
45

See e.g. Public-Private Partnerships Global Campaign Manifesto (launched in 2017 with 152
signatories in 45 countries) available at https://eurodad.org/files/pdf/1546821-world-bank-muststop-promoting-dangerous-public-private-partnerships-1536152729.pdf.
46
Available at https://www.ilo.org/declaration/lang--en/index.htm.
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change, loss of biodiversity, energy transitions, resources constraints, and other
environmental challenges. Policies and legal frameworks can be used to promote
advancements on climate goals, protection and resilience, and to avoid undesirable
climate impacts.
It is absolutely critical that any updated Legislative Guide address and advance, in a
holistic and comprehensive manner, the role that PPPs can and should play in adapting to
and mitigating climate change in a way that promotes the objectives of the Paris
Agreement. Considering states’ commitments to address climate mitigation and
adaptation, the Legislative Guide should contain advice on how states should embed
climate consideration in PPPs, from the choice of projects and technology, climate risk
assessment, to appropriate allocation of climate risks. It is becoming increasingly
possible to anticipate changes in climate and their effects; as a result, not all climate risks
should be shouldered by the contracting authority, and the private partner should explore
the use of available insurance products, among other things. Disputes around the impacts
of climate change on PPPs should be flexibly resolved. Any general change in law and
policy to address climate mitigation and adaptation should not trigger the obligation of
states to pay compensation to private partners pursuant to stabilization clauses in PPP
contracts.
i. Environment
While various draft chapters refer to the imperative of environmental protection, the
references are insufficient or inaccurate in certain places.
Chapter III (Contract Award) mentions environmental considerations in multiple places.
One such reference in Section C (Procedures requesting proposals), paragraph 2 (Content
of the request for proposals) (a) (i) (d) (Environmental Impact), should clearly require
that: (i) the result of the environmental and social impact assessment, which will include
high level recommendations on impact mitigation or management measures, must be
translated into project-specific environmental and social action plan by the bidder: (ii)
this action plan must be costed out; (iii) such cost must be included in the overall
financial proposal of the bidder; and (iv) the winning bidder must be required to covenant
its action plan in the PPP contract. A reference to compliance with applicable national
environmental law or international environmental standards is insufficient. Without this
explicit link between the environmental and social impact assessment outcome and the
specific action plan that the bidder must prepare, cost out and include in the financial
proposal, the environmental and social impact assessment could be reduced to a mere
theoretical study that fails to provide a solid basis for the winning project’s overall
environmental and social mitigation measures for the life of the project.
Another example is paragraph 43 of Chapter VII. The paragraph focuses on
environmental permits that must be obtained upfront, but does not refer to the ongoing
respective responsibilities of the private partner and contracting authority. These are the
private partner’s environmental obligations for the duration of the PPP (either by
operation of environmental law or under the environmental action plan that results from
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the process of environmental and social impact assessment, including monitoring and
reporting) and the contracting authority’s obligation to support, monitor and oversee the
environmental performance of the private partner. These activities should not be left to
the operation of the applicable environmental law alone, which will not be specific
enough and may not extend to issues that were negotiated between the contracting
authority and the private partner. Furthermore, the list of multilateral environmental
agreements (MEAs) referred to in paragraph 44 of Chapter VII is a partial list that does
not take into account the full scope of relevant MEAs. The list should refer to the United
Nations Environmental Programme list of MEAs.
Furthermore, the Legislative Guide notes that investors in PPPs will frequently use a
corporate structure including a limited liability special purpose vehicle. While this is a
corporate model that permits greater financial leverage and thus more investment, it can
also be a risk to host states and societies when the private partner is responsible for largescale environmental disaster but the off-shore nature of the private partner’s corporate
family and limited liability nature of the investment make it difficult to gain standing in
foreign courts or to enforce damage awards from local courts. Planning and a robust legal
and regulatory framework can decrease risks to host societies, and these types of
recommendations should be included in the updated Legislative Guide.47
j. Sovereign debt and fiscal burden
Many countries around the world are currently facing situations of sovereign debt
distress. IMF research found that 40 per cent of low-income developing countries face
“significant debt-related challenges”, up from 21 per cent just five years ago.48 Evidence
demonstrates that PPPs, when correctly reflected on balance sheet, can significantly
impact government balance sheets through explicit and contingent liabilities, credit
enhancements and other risk mitigation actions that benefit the investor. Renegotiation
and litigation risk are often difficult to quantify ex ante. Moreover, incentives granted to
investors can negatively impact government fiscal space. The process by which a PPP
tender occurs and the transparency of, information generated by, and broader public
participation in the contracting process can also impact the short and long-term
government decision-making and fiscal burden. The Legislative Guide could usefully
explain the various factors and processes that can positively and negatively impact the

47

Including, e.g. (1) ensuring contractual obligations to comply with performance standards
(either domestic or foreign law, or IFIs) (2) requiring submission of technical experience and
capability and appointment of technical advisors (3) financial security (including from parent
companies) (4) independent EIAs and ongoing assessments (5) human rights impact assessments
(6) ring-fencing revenues, fees or tariffs (7) trainings on industry practice (8) ensuring
enforcement capacity (9) considering instances in which “piercing the corporate veil” is desired
(10) establishing environmental courts or training specialist judges. See Columbia Center on
Sustainable Investment and Ashurst, “Preparing Legal Frameworks for Environmental Disasters:
Practical Considerations for Host States,” (forthcoming).
48
IMF. Macroeconomic Developments and Prospects in Low-Income Developing Countries—
2018.
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financial and fiscal outcomes of PPPs, and suggest the use of appropriate fiscal risk
assessment process and public disclosure of contingent liabilities arising from PPPs.
k. Tax
Chapter VII, Section 9 on taxation should be updated to account for varying practices and
needs of different economies, for example, with respect to tax stabilization clauses and
alternatives to such approaches that may similarly address concerns about the risk profile
of an investment. This section should be updated to reflect current advancements and
sustainable development-oriented practices with respect to the use of tax havens,
transparency of beneficial ownership interest, base erosion and profit shifting, the use of
tax incentives, and prevention of tax treaty shopping. The Legislative Guide should also
address ways in which the contracting parties equitably share the windfall benefits of the
PPP. For the fiscal aspects of stabilization, see subsection (m) below.
l. Updates to norms on dispute resolution
As a general matter, Chapter VI is drafted as if dispute resolution of PPPs were purely a
private international law matter. When a government is involved in an investment
dispute, even when such dispute is contractual, the public nature of government
obligations must be accounted for. This includes, for example:
•
•

•

concerns surrounding mediation or settlement of disputes without public
oversight;49
government obligations (whether based in domestic or international normative or
legal frameworks) to and the rights (including information and effective
participation and property rights, among others) of non-disputing parties who may
not be party to a dispute resolution process but whose rights may be impacted by
its outcome (particularly with respect to mediation, settlement, or arbitration);50
and
public policy considerations of contractual and dispute resolution language and
location when such language is not the dominant language of the host country and
when a dispute is being resolved in a location outside of the host country, when
such languages and location make it difficult for the host government and/or other

Lise Johnson and Brooke Skartvedt Guven, “The Settlement of Investment Disputes: A
Discussion of Public Accountability and the Public Interest,” Investment Treaty News (March 13,
2017) available at https://www.iisd.org/itn/2017/03/13/the-settlement-of-investment-disputes-adiscussion-of-democratic-accountability-and-the-public-interest-lise-johnson-and-brookeskartvedt-guven/.
50
See e.g., Lorenzo Cotula and Mika Schröder “Community perspectives in investor-state
arbitration,” IIED Land, Investment and Rights Series (2017) available at
http://pubs.iied.org/pdfs/12603IIED.pdf.
49
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stakeholders to adequately and effectively participate in and/or monitor
contractual and dispute resolution processes and outcomes;
Moreover, there are currently much broader criticisms of some of the processes described
in the draft proposed updates to the Legislative Guide, including arbitration, which must
be addressed in any updated Legislative Guide. For example, UNCITRAL’s Working
Group III has recently concluded that, with respect to investor-state arbitration (ISDS),
there are identified problems relating to (i) consistency, including coherence,
predictability and correctness of the outcome of ISDS, (ii) arbitrators and decisionmakers, and (iii) costs and duration, and has decided that reform of ISDS is desirable in
light of these concerns. That Working Group will discuss concerns surrounding thirdparty funding and other broader concerns of ISDS in its April 2019 session.51 These kinds
of procedural concerns relating to investor-state arbitration also apply to some extent to
contractual arbitration involving states.
While a few proposed changes aim to address developments in the nature of investment
dispute resolution over the past 15 years, a more fundamental reorientation of this chapter
should follow.
m. Stabilization of laws
Stabilization of laws has been a standard fixture in PPP contracts, and in certain
countries, in investment laws. This practice can have a serious negative impact on the
host country, as documented in several studies.52 Chapter IV’s treatment on the subject
appears not to reflect the current thinking around how to introduce some criteria to limit
stabilization. For example, the increased insight into the different nature and
consequences of fiscal stabilization compared to non-fiscal stabilization is leading to a
recognition that these should be treated differently, and that the former type of
stabilization should be considered while latter type should be strongly discouraged. Such
advance in the debate around stabilization should be mentioned instead of offering
commentary on the existing practice of shielding the private partner from risks associated
with change in laws. Any such discussion on fiscal stabilization should be coordinated
with discussion of taxation in Chapter VII.
***

UNCITRAL’s Working Group III has limited its mandate to procedural concerns and not
substantive concerns or solutions. Much criticism of ISDS goes well beyond that which is being
discussed in UNCITRAL and relates to: the impact of ISDS on inter-and intra-national inequality;
the rights, interests and access to justice of third-parties; the negative impact that investment law
may have on the development of the rule of law and jurisprudence in domestic legal systems; the
right and duty of host and home state governments to regulate in the public interest; the fiscal and
financial impacts of awards; among others.
52
Such as IFC’s report on Stabilization Clauses and Human Rights (2009), available at:
https://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/9feb5b00488555eab8c4fa6a6515bb18/Stabilization%2BPa
per.pdf?MOD=AJPERES; also see OHCHR (2018).
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We close our submission by noting that an updated Legislative Guide is the first step in
ensuring broader and more widespread transparency, participation and accountability of
PPPs. However, given its critical importance in this process, the Legislative Guide too
should be open to such processes. We thus strongly encourage the Secretariat and the
Commission to engage in a meaningful process of public engagement, which should, at a
minimum, include an open comment period on any draft Legislative Guide, with time set
aside for further revisions to meaningfully incorporate public input.
We look forward to elaborating further on these matters and integrating these suggestions
into the Legislative Guide in greater detail at the upcoming Intergovernmental Expert
Group Meeting on Public Private Partnerships, scheduled from 26 to 30 November 2018,
as well as in ongoing work and discussions.
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